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OVERAWED AND OVERWHELMED: JUVENILE
MIRANDA INCOMPREHENSION
Sara Cressey*
ABSTRACT
Each year approximately one million juveniles in the United States are arrested
and read the Miranda warnings. Though studies have shown that the majority of
those children do not understand the warnings, most of them must decide alone
whether to waive their constitutional rights—and nearly all ultimately make that
choice without the help of an attorney. The Supreme Court has recognized that
children differ from adults in critical ways, and those differences have important
implications for juveniles’ ability to meaningfully waive their Miranda rights. To
ensure that juveniles’ constitutional rights are protected, the Supreme Court should
take up the issue and create a per se rule making a juvenile’s Miranda waiver invalid
unless that juvenile first consulted with counsel.
I. INTRODUCTION
During the early morning hours of May 1, 2011, Jeff Hall slept off a night of
drinking on the couch in his California home, underneath a large flag bearing a
Swastika that hung on the wall.1 Around 4 a.m., Jeff’s ten-year-old son, Joseph,
retrieved a handgun from a low shelf in the house, approached his father’s motionless
body, and fired a shot into his skull at close range. 2 When the police arrived on the
scene, the boy told an officer that he had shot his father and asked whether “people
get more than one life.”3 Later that same day, the small, disheveled boy sat in a
police interrogation room where he waived his Miranda rights and gave a videotaped
confession.4 In the course of that interrogation, Joseph made several other statements
suggesting that he could neither predict the outcome of his actions nor fully
understand the consequences of those actions. “I wasn’t really thinking about if he
was gonna die or get unconscious,” he told the detective, referring to his father. 5 “I
just thought maybe . . . he might learn a lesson . . . I was trying to get him to know
how I feel when I get hurt . . . . Then maybe we could go back to being friends and
start all over.”6
* J.D. Candidate at the University of Maine School of Law, Class of 2018. I am deeply grateful to
Professor Richard Chen for his invaluable insights on an earlier draft of this piece, and to Professor
Christopher Northrop for inspiring my passion for juvenile law and steering me to this topic. I am also
indebted to Connor Schratz, my editor, for his thoughtful feedback and unwavering encouragement.
Finally, to my parents, I cannot thank you enough for everything that you do for me. None of this would
be possible without you.
1
Amy Wallace, A Very Dangerous Boy, GQ (Nov. 4, 2013, 2:00 AM),
http://www.gq.com/story/joseph-hall-murders-neo-nazi-father-story [https://perma.cc/MB2F-MQZ8].
2
Id.
3
Id.
4
Id.
5
Id.
6
Id.
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Joseph Hall’s story is heart-wrenching. In some ways it is unique: his father led
a chapter of the nation’s largest neo-Nazi party, the National Socialist Movement,
for which he held frequent meetings at his home that his son would attend.7 Yet parts
of his story are all too familiar, and true for many kids caught up in the justice system:
his childhood was marked by violence, malnourishment, and allegations of abuse by
both of his parents.8 Joseph’s story also raises a concern that is implicated whenever
juveniles come into contact with the justice system: children’s ability to understand
and to meaningfully waive their constitutional rights during custodial interrogation.
Joseph was just one of over a million juveniles who were arrested in the United
States in 2011.9 Of those children, 67,193 were between the ages of ten and twelve. 10
That means that tens of thousands of other children like Joseph sat in police
interrogation rooms or in the back of police cruisers while they were read their
Miranda rights and had to decide whether to give up those rights and speak to the
police. None of those children were automatically afforded the opportunity to
consult with counsel before waiving their rights, though some were afforded the
opportunity to consult with a parent or other “interested adult.”11 Studies indicate
that the majority of those children did waive their constitutional rights, 12 and that few
of them truly understood what they were giving up. 13
Juveniles waive their Miranda rights at a remarkably high rate, around ninety
percent.14 This high waiver rate has been attributed to a number of different factors,
from parents’ insistence that children always tell the truth, to the high pressure
inherent in custodial interrogation, to a lack of understanding by the juvenile.15
Indeed, one study found that “only one-fifth (20.9%) of juveniles, as compared with
almost half (42.3%) of adults, grasped the entire warning.” 16 In reference to Joseph’s
case, constitutional law scholar Erwin Chemerinsky wrote, “[a] 10-year-old child
cannot waive his or her constitutional rights. By any measure of competence, a child
that young cannot understand constitutional rights or the consequences of waiving
them.”17 Social science supports Professor Chemerinsky’s assertion, and the
Supreme Court has taken notice in recent years. 18
7
Jesse McKinley, Neo-Nazi Father Is Killed; Son, 10, Steeped in Beliefs, Is Accused, N.Y. TIMES
(May 10, 2011), http://www.nytimes.com/2011/05/11/us/11nazi.html?pagewanted=all&_r=0
[https://perma.cc/LF29-JWVJ].
8
Id.
9
Brief of Amicus Curiae Hum. Rts. Watch in Support of Petition for Writ of Cert. at 5, Joseph H. v.
California (2016) (No. 15-1086).
10
Id.
11
See infra Part III (detailing juvenile Miranda waiver protocols in different states).
12
Barry C. Feld, Behind Closed Doors: What Really Happens when Cops Question Kids, 23 CORNELL
J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 395, 429 (2013).
13
See infra Part II.E.2 (discussing the results of studies assessing juveniles’ ability to understand
Miranda warnings).
14
Feld, supra note 12, at 429.
15
Id.
16
Id. at 409.
17
Erwin Chemerinsky, Opinion, Court Gets it Wrong with Boy Who Killed Neo-Nazi Dad, ORANGE
COUNTY REGISTER (Oct. 22, 2015, 12:00 AM), http://www.ocregister.com/articles/%20court-688579boy-rights.html [https://perma.cc/Q5PL-PZG4].
18
See infra Part II.D (discussing the impact of developments in psychology and brain research on the
Supreme Court’s recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence).
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The Supreme Court recognized more than half a century ago that children are
more susceptible to police tactics than adults.19 This concept has been central in the
Court’s recent decisions affording juveniles greater protection under the Eighth
Amendment – cases that have firmly established that children are different from
adults for constitutional purposes.20 That precedent, coupled with evidence that the
warnings mandated by Miranda v. Arizona do not effectively protect juveniles’ Fifth
Amendment rights,21 weighs strongly in favor of a Supreme Court decision
establishing a more stringent standard for juvenile Miranda waivers. In most states,
juveniles’ Miranda waivers are assessed by weighing the totality of the
circumstances, an approach that has led to widely varied and arbitrary outcomes
across the country.22 To ensure that juveniles’ constitutional rights are truly
protected, the Supreme Court should take up the issue and create a per se rule making
a juvenile’s Miranda waiver invalid unless that juvenile first consulted with counsel.
Part II provides an overview of the relevant legal and scientific background,
including the advent of the Miranda warning and its application to juveniles, the
Supreme Court’s juvenile sentencing cases and the principles relied upon therein,
relevant psychological and neurological research, and research examining the effect
of police tactics on the waiver process. Part III surveys the various approaches to
assessing juvenile Miranda waivers that are used in different states, as well as recent
initiatives to put in place more meaningful protections. Finally, Part IV presents the
argument that requiring consultation with counsel before a juvenile can waive his
constitutional rights is the only way to truly protect those rights.
II. BACKGROUND
To appreciate the difficult issues concerning the validity of juveniles’ waivers
of their Miranda rights, one must understand them in both their social and legal
context. Growing efforts across the country to afford children greater protection
during custodial interrogation have been informed by social and cognitive science, 23
as have recent Supreme Court decisions grappling with the rights of juveniles in other
contexts.24 The following sections will first provide an overview of the development
of Miranda warnings and the applicability of the Miranda safeguards to juveniles,
the evolution of police interrogation procedures post-Miranda, the Court’s recent
Eighth Amendment cases and the significance of the Court’s reliance on neurological
and psychological research, and finally research specifically addressing juveniles’
capacity to comprehend Miranda warnings.
19

See Haley v. Ohio, 332 U.S. 596, 599-600 (1948).
See generally Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460
(2012); Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
21
See infra Part II.E.2 (detailing research assessing juveniles’ Miranda comprehension, which has
found that juveniles cannot consistently and reliably understand their Miranda rights).
22
See infra Part III.A.1.
23
See, e.g., An Act to Add Section 625.6 to the Welfare and Institutions Code Relating to Juveniles,
SB-1052 § 1(a), 2016 Sess. (Cal. 2016), (CALIFORNIA LEGISLATIVE INFORMATION),
https://leginfo.legislature.ca.gov/faces/billTextClient.xhtml?bill_id=201520160SB1052
[https://perma.cc/8R5P-T6UK] (citing studies showing that development continues into adulthood and
that adolescents tend to disregard long-term implications of actions).
24
See infra Part II.D.
20
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A. The Advent of Miranda Warnings
In 1966 the Supreme Court decided Miranda v. Arizona, laying out the nowubiquitous warnings that police must read before interrogating a person who is in
custody.25 Anyone who has ever watched an American procedural drama has no
doubt witnessed a stern police officer or FBI agent handcuffing a suspect, telling him
that he has the right to remain silent, and making a quip about justice being served
while leading him to a nearby police cruiser.26
Miranda marked the first time that the Supreme Court explicitly extended the
Fifth Amendment privilege against compelled self-incrimination to suspects being
interrogated while in police custody. The opinion made clear that the Fifth
Amendment “protects persons in all settings in which their freedom of action is
curtailed in any significant way,” including those interrogated by the police, “from
being compelled to incriminate themselves.” 27 The Court’s decision was motivated
by its concern that the coercive atmosphere inherent in custodial interrogation was
leading individuals who may otherwise have asserted their constitutional rights to
succumb to police pressure. 28 To ensure that statements made in the course of
custodial interrogation are “truly the product of free choice,” 29 the Court put in place
procedural safeguards: a series of warnings that police must administer to a suspect
before questioning him.30 The Court mandated that, “[p]rior to any questioning, the
person . . . be warned that he has a right to remain silent, that any statement he does
make may be used as evidence against him, and that he has a right to the presence of
an attorney, either retained or appointed.”31
In the course of its analysis, the Court engaged in a lengthy examination of
police interrogation procedures, noting that officers are instructed to employ tactics
designed to “deprive[] [the subject] of every psychological advantage,” 32 including
isolating the subject,33 positing his guilt as a fact,34 and questioning him for long
periods of time, providing “no respite from the atmosphere of domination.” 35 Yet
even without employing such tactics, the Court asserted, “the very fact of custodial
interrogation exacts a heavy toll on individual liberty and trades on the weakness of
individuals.”36 The Court readily concluded that this oppressive atmosphere is at
odds with the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-incrimination.37
After the warnings are administered, “[t]he defendant may waive effectuation of
these rights, provided that the waiver is made voluntarily, knowingly and

25

Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436, 444 (1966).
See Ronald Steiner, Rebecca Bauer & Rohit Talwar, The Rise and Fall of the Miranda Warnings
in Popular Culture, 59 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 219, 226 (2011).
27
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 467.
28
Id. at 456.
29
Id. at 457.
30
Id. at 444.
31
Id.
32
Id. at 449.
33
Id. at 456-58.
34
Id. at 450.
35
Id. at 451.
36
Id. at 455.
37
Id. at 457-58.
26
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intelligently.”38 If Miranda warnings are administered and an interrogation proceeds
without an attorney present, the Court made it clear that “a heavy burden rests on the
government” to show that the person in custody made a knowing and intelligent
waiver of his rights.39 However, a person’s waiver does not need to be explicit in
order to be valid; as long as the prosecutor proves by a preponderance of the evidence
that the suspect knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights, a subsequent statement
may be admitted into evidence.40
In prescribing the Miranda safeguards, the Court noted that the Constitution
does not mandate any one solution to the problem of inherent police coercion during
custodial interrogation.41 Congress and the States are free to seek out alternatives,
but must observe the Court’s safeguards unless they are able to develop procedures
that are at least as effective as the mandated warnings in apprising persons who have
been accused of crimes of their rights. 42 The Court recently reaffirmed that the
protections announced in Miranda are “constitutionally required” and noted that
subsequent cases have “reaffirm[ed] the decision’s core ruling that unwarned
statements may not be used as evidence in the prosecution’s case in chief.” 43
The procedural safeguards set out in Miranda were plainly intended to be a
practical solution to what the Court perceived as a serious problem in the criminal
justice system. The Court sought to protect against the “evils” of coercive police
tactics and “protect precious Fifth Amendment rights” by ensuring that suspects are
reminded of those rights.44 Ideally, the person would then be emboldened to exercise
them. This assumes, however, that the person not only understands his rights, but
also that he understands the advantage to be gained from invoking them. Very often,
and particularly with juveniles, neither is true.
B. Extending the Privilege Against Self-Incrimination to Juveniles
When Miranda was decided, the Court had not yet spoken to the issue of
whether basic due process and other constitutional requirements apply equally in
juvenile delinquency proceedings as they do in adult criminal proceedings. 45 One
year after Miranda, however, the Supreme Court answered that question
unequivocally in the affirmative. In its landmark decision in In re Gault, the Court
asserted that “neither the Fourteenth Amendment nor the Bill of Rights is for adults
alone.”46 Not only does the privilege against self-incrimination apply to juveniles
just as it does to adults,47 it is even more compelling with respect to juveniles.48

38

Id. at 444.
Id. at 475.
40
See Colorado v. Connelly, 479 U.S. 157, 168 (1986) (holding that the State need only prove waiver
of Miranda rights by a preponderance of the evidence); North Carolina v. Butler, 441 U.S. 369, 373 (1979)
(holding that a person may make an implicit waiver of his Miranda rights).
41
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 475.
42
Id. at 490.
43
Dickerson v. United States, 530 U.S. 428, 438, 443-44 (2000).
44
Miranda, 384 U.S. at 456-57.
45
In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1, 11 (1967).
46
Id. at 13.
47
Id. at 55.
48
Id. at 48.
39
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Though the Court presciently remarked that “special problems may arise with
respect to waiver of the privilege by or on behalf of children,” it set no standard for
assessing juveniles’ waivers in Gault.49 The Court did, however, imply that attorneys
should play an important role:
The participation of counsel will, of course, assist . . . in administering the privilege.
If counsel was not present for some permissible reason when an admission was
obtained, the greatest care must be taken to assure that the admission was voluntary
. . . that it was not the product of ignorance of rights or of adolescent fantasy, fright
or despair.50

It was not until more than a decade later that the Court established the standard for
assessing juvenile Miranda waivers, in Fare v. Michael C.51 In order to ascertain
whether a person in police custody “in fact knowingly and voluntarily decided to
forego his rights to remain silent and to have the assistance of counsel,” the Court
held that a totality of the circumstances analysis suffices for juveniles as well as
adults.52 Such an analysis mandates the evaluation of a number of factors, including
“the juvenile’s age, experience, education, background, and intelligence, and . . .
whether he has the capacity to understand the warnings given him, the nature of his
Fifth Amendment rights, and the consequences of waiving those rights.” 53 The Court
asserted that lower courts have the expertise necessary “to take into account those
special concerns,” including “limited experience and education” and “immature
judgment,” that make juvenile waivers especially suspect. 54
Though Gault established that children must be accorded the same constitutional
protections as adults, the notion that children are different is no novelty in American
jurisprudence. In 1948, the Court recognized that children are more susceptible to
police tactics, remarking in Haley v. Ohio that “[t]hat which would leave a man cold
and unimpressed can overawe and overwhelm a lad in his early teens” and
concluding that even a fifteen-year-old “cannot be judged by the more exacting
standards of maturity.”55 Theoretically, the totality of the circumstances test is
appropriate in the juvenile context given its flexibility; it allows courts to take into
account this heightened susceptibility. Though some courts have given meaningful
weight to age when analyzing juveniles’ Miranda waivers, others have engaged in
only a cursory analysis of the effect of age when evaluating the voluntariness of
waivers.56
C. Police Interrogation Procedures Post-Miranda
Though the Miranda Court sought to “dispel” the compulsion inherent in a
custodial interrogation by requiring that suspects be warned of their rights, in practice
Miranda has simply shifted the use of coercive police tactics to the administration of
49

Id. at 55.
Id.
51
442 U.S. 707, 725 (1979).
52
Id.
53
Id.
54
Id.
55
332 U.S. 596, 599 (1948).
56
See infra Part III.A.1.
50
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those warnings. Barry Feld, a law professor at the University of Minnesota,
conducted an in-depth study of 307 files of juveniles charged with felonies in four
counties in Minnesota and examined the circumstances under which juveniles either
waived or invoked their rights.57 Of the key players in the juvenile justice system
whom Feld interviewed, police officers asserted that adolescents understood the
warnings, while judges and public defenders largely agreed that juveniles did not
even meet the initial threshold of understanding the language of the warning, let
alone appreciating its importance.58 “Unfortunately,” one judge remarked, “I don’t
think a lot of them [understand the warning]. . . . [W]hen they don’t have an adult
representative or a parent or an attorney, I don’t think they get it . . . I think most of
them think it’s just a protocol.”59 Feld’s investigation indicates that this perception
of the Miranda warnings as simply a protocol is no accident; rather, it is the direct
result of police training and tactics.60
As Feld notes, “[o]ne of Miranda’s root contradictions is that ‘it assumes that
these suspects can receive adequate advice and counseling about their constitutional
rights from adversaries who would like nothing more than to see those rights
surrendered.’”61 Police officers are responsible for administering Miranda warnings
and have complete control over how they are presented. In order to obtain the result
they seek, “[o]fficers must give a Miranda warning and elicit a waiver without
alerting the suspect to its significance or consequences.” 62 Police can comply with
Miranda’s requirement that they inform suspects of their rights “and predispose
suspects to perceive waiver as the normal and expected response.” 63 Feld reports
that
[t]raining manuals instruct police to blend the warning into the conversation, to
describe it as a formality that understates its importance, to tell suspects that this is
their opportunity to tell their story, or to summarize the evidence and tell suspects
that they can only explain it if they waive their rights.64

Though these tactics may seem relatively benign, the implications are serious.
By intentionally employing tactics designed to coerce a waiver, police
“compl[y] with the letter, but not the spirit, of the required fourfold warnings”
mandated by Miranda.65 To effectively dispel the compulsive pressures that are now
inherent in the administration of Miranda warnings and elicitation of waivers,
57
Feld “copied and coded tapes or transcripts, police reports, juvenile court records, and sentence
reports for those interrogations” in addition to interviewing “more than three dozen police, prosecutors,
defense lawyers, and judges” to corroborate his findings with their experience. BARRY C. FELD, KIDS,
COPS, AND CONFESSIONS 11 (2013).
58
However, police officers, public defenders, and judges did all distinguish between juveniles’ ability
to understand the language in the waiver versus the ability to appreciate what they were giving up when
they waived their Miranda rights. Id. at 82-85.
59
Id. at 83.
60
Id. at 79-82.
61
Id. at 76 (quoting Patrick Malone, You Have the Right to Remain Silent: Miranda After Twenty
Years, 55 AM. SCHOLAR 367, 377 (1986)).
62
Id. at 76.
63
Id. at 78.
64
Id. at 79.
65
Id. at 93 (quoting Richard A. Leo, Miranda’s Revenge: Police Interrogation as a Confidence Game,
30 L. & SOC’Y REV. 259, 260 (1996)).
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counsel must be present. Even a parent or other “interested adult” may not
understand that the Miranda warnings are not mere protocol, and that making a
waiver and talking to the police can have serious consequences. The combination of
juveniles’ documented inability to understand the meaning or appreciate the
importance of the Miranda warnings, coupled with suggestion from the police officer
that a waiver is the expected result, make it incredibly unlikely that a juvenile will
invoke his constitutional rights during custodial interrogation.
D. Eighth Amendment Jurisprudence for Juveniles
Over the last decade, the Supreme Court has reaffirmed the conclusion that
children are different from adults and has methodically carved out a separate place
in its Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for juveniles. 66 Foreclosing first the
imposition of the death penalty upon juvenile offenders as a class, then the
imposition of life-without-parole sentences for juvenile nonhomicide offenders, and
finally the imposition of mandatory life-without-parole sentences upon juvenile
homicide offenders, the Court has firmly established that children are different from
adults for the purposes of sentencing under the Eighth Amendment.67 In identifying
the characteristics of youth that significantly diminish juveniles’ culpability for
purposes of sentencing, the Court relied on both psychology and neuroscience. 68
This section will provide a brief overview of the Court’s Eighth Amendment
jurisprudence and highlight the impact of psychological and neurological studies in
shaping the Court’s most recent decisions.
The Eighth Amendment prohibits the infliction of cruel and unusual
punishments,69 a standard that has proven imprecise in application.70 The Court’s
modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence is marked by the principle that the
Amendment “must draw its meaning from the evolving standards of decency that
mark the progress of a maturing society.”71 The foregoing maxim was set forth by
the Court in the late 1950’s, but the Court acknowledged over a hundred years ago
that its interpretation of the Eighth Amendment must necessarily change over time. 72
For a constitution to remain relevant, it must “be capable of wider application than
the mischief which gave it birth.”73 In other words, the Court must look not only to
the past but also to “what may be” when interpreting its provisions. 74 Under this
approach, the Eighth Amendment prohibits more than just punishments that are
“inhuman and barbarous,”75 and consequently its reach has broadened over time.76
66
See Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct. 718 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 132 S. Ct. 2455 (2012);
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48 (2010); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551 (2005).
67
Miller, 132 S. Ct. at 2475.
68
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
69
U.S. CONST. amend. VIII.
70
Trop v. Dulles, 356 U.S. 86, 100-01 (1958).
71
Id. at 101.
72
Weems v. United States, 217 U.S. 349, 373 (1910).
73
Id.
74
Id.
75
Id. at 368.
76
See Wilkerson v. Utah, 99 U.S. 130, 136 (1878) (holding that the Eighth Amendment prohibits
torture); see also, e.g., Robinson v. California, 370 U.S. 660, 667 (1962) (holding that imprisoning a
person for being addicted to narcotics is cruel and unusual punishment); Weems, 217 U.S. at 362-63

96

MAINE LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 70:1

Today the Court assesses Eighth Amendment challenges using a proportionality
test, the roots of which go back to the early twentieth century. 77 In fact, the Court
recently recognized the concept of proportionality as “central to the Eighth
Amendment,” reaffirming in numerous decisions the requirement that punishment
be proportioned to the offense.78 Determining what is “cruel and unusual” using this
framework of excessiveness adds significantly to the list of punishments prohibited
under the Eighth Amendment; it opens the door for the Court to find a particular term
of years sentence unconstitutional that may not appear “cruel and unusual” when
considered in isolation, but becomes so when considered in light of the offense
committed.
Within the Court’s line of cases requiring proportionality between crime and
punishment is a subset of cases holding certain punishments disproportionate to the
charged offense, and therefore unconstitutional, when applied to juveniles. 79 In its
2005 decision in Roper v. Simmons, the Court drew upon both its own precedent and
psychological studies in identifying several characteristics of youth that make
juveniles “categorically less culpable” than adults, among them immaturity,
irresponsibility, and susceptibility to external pressures. 80 These fundamental
differences between adults and juveniles make it nearly impossible to distinguish
between a juvenile whose crime merely reflects immaturity and one whose crime
reflects “irreparable corruption.”81 The Court thus concluded that juveniles cannot
reliably be classified among the “worst [class of] offenders” for whom the death
penalty is appropriate; as such, the execution of juvenile offenders is
unconstitutionally disproportionate punishment under the Eighth Amendment. 82
Five years later the Court again distinguished between juveniles and adults for
the purposes of sentencing in Graham v. Florida. Echoing Roper, the Court
emphasized the inherent characteristics of youth in asserting that juveniles have
“lessened culpability” and are “less deserving of the most severe punishments.” 83
The Court noted that the rationale supporting its decision in Roper had been bolstered
in the intervening years as “developments in psychology and brain science continue
to show fundamental differences between juvenile and adult minds.” 84 In light of
the aforementioned considerations, the Court held that the Eighth Amendment
prohibits a sentence of life without parole for juvenile offenders who did not commit
homicide.85
The Court’s Eighth Amendment jurisprudence for juvenile offenders was thus
(holding that fifteen years’ imprisonment for falsification of a public document is cruel and unusual
punishment).
77
See Weems, 217 U.S. at 366-67 (“[I]t is a precept of justice that punishment for crime should be
graduated and proportioned to the offense.”).
78
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 59 (2010); see also, e.g., Montgomery v. Louisiana, 136 S. Ct.
718, 732-33 (2016); Miller v. Alabama, 567 U.S. 460, 469 (2012); Roper v. Simmons, 543 U.S. 551, 560
(2005); Atkins v. Virginia, 536 U.S. 304, 311 (2002).
79
See Montgomery, 136 S. Ct. at 732.
80
Roper, 543 U.S. at 567, 569.
81
Id. at 573.
82
Id. at 568, 570, 575.
83
Graham, 560 U.S. at 68.
84
Id.
85
Id. at 74.
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developing quickly, with two decisions in the span of five years categorically barring
certain penalties for juvenile offenders, when Miller v. Alabama was decided in
2012.86 The thrust behind the Court’s decision in Miller was, simply put, that
children are different from adults. 87 The Court reiterated the principle asserted in
Roper and Graham that juveniles are categorically less culpable than adults given
their “transient rashness, proclivity for risk, and inability to assess consequences.” 88
As such, a sentencing scheme that mandates life in prison without the possibility of
parole for juvenile offenders violates the Eighth Amendment because it precludes
consideration of age and the characteristics that come with it.89 Age, in other words,
is an indispensable factor in a judge’s evaluation of the circumstances during
sentencing.
The foregoing decisions show that it is inappropriate to simply treat juveniles as
“miniature adults.”90 Juveniles are fundamentally different, especially in the context
of the criminal justice system. Though the Court’s decisions in Roper, Graham, and
Miller were based upon a determination about juveniles’ culpability in the context
of sentencing, the underlying reasoning in those cases has implications for juveniles
in criminal law more broadly. 91 The Court remarked in Miller that one of the
“incompetencies associated with youth” is the “inability to deal with police officers
or prosecutors.”92 Also among the “hallmark features” of youth are “immaturity,
impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and consequences.” 93 In the context of
custodial interrogation, juveniles’ comparative inability to deal effectively with
police, coupled with their inability to assess and appreciate consequences, is deeply
troubling.
E. The Science of Adolescence
1. Background and General Principles
Scientific studies confirm the correlation between the characteristics of youth
identified by the Supreme Court and juveniles’ inability to comprehend Miranda
warnings. Though the Supreme Court relied on general observations about the
cognitive and behavioral differences between adults and children in its Eighth
Amendment cases, significant research has also been conducted specifically to
evaluate juveniles’ ability to understand the Miranda warnings and make reasoned
decisions under the pressures of custodial interrogation. 94
86
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88
Miller, 567 U.S. at 472.
89
Id. at 477-79.
90
J.D.B. v. North Carolina, 564 U.S. 261, 274 (2011).
91
See Petition for Writ of Certiorari at 14, Joseph H. v. California, 137 S. Ct. 34 (Jan. 14, 2016) (No.
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The unique characteristics and “incompetencies”95 of youth that the Supreme
Court has identified stem from the fact that juveniles’ brains are simply different
from those of fully developed adults. Kenneth King provides an overview of the key
neurological differences between juveniles and adults in an article examining the
totality of the circumstances test as applied to juveniles’ Miranda waivers.96 The
regions of the brain that facilitate abstract reasoning mature later than other regions
of the brain—a fact that strongly supports several key conclusions.97
Adolescents . . . have a lesser ability to reason and interpret information than adults
have. Adolescents are not wired to process abstract information efficiently or to
pick and choose between alternative actions while analyzing the consequences of
each. Executive functions, which are essential to reasoning, reside in the frontal
cortex . . . . This part of the brain, unarguably critical to making informed decisions
with respect to legal rights, is the part of the brain that develops last.98

Processing abstract information and analyzing the consequences of alternative
choices are, as King notes, indispensable skills to the comprehension and exercise of
legal rights.
Researchers Abigail Baird and Jonathan Fugelsang have also observed that the
legal system places a premium on this ability to “imagine alternative outcomes and
understand the consequences of those outcomes,” a process that they refer to as
“counterfactual thinking.”99 This is especially true in the context of Miranda
warnings, where a juvenile must weigh the consequences of waiving his rights and
speaking to the police against the consequences of invoking his rights and remaining
silent or requesting an attorney. Evidence from numerous studies suggests that “it
may be physically impossible for adolescents to engage in counterfactual reasoning,”
meaning that juveniles may be unable to “foresee the possible consequences of their
actions.”100 This inability is a result of adolescents’ “neural hardware,”101 including
an underdeveloped prefrontal cortex, the area of the brain understood to be critical
to “cognitive, social and emotional processes.” 102
As noted above, the Court relied heavily on similar psychological and
neurological studies in its recent Eighth Amendment jurisprudence.103 This science
is likewise applicable in the context of the Fifth Amendment privilege against self-
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incrimination, and researchers have conducted a number of studies assessing
juveniles’ capacity to understand and appreciate the Miranda warnings.
2. Juvenile Miranda Comprehension
The ability to make a truly meaningful decision about whether to relinquish
one’s constitutional rights requires several tiers of mental processes. One recent
study evaluating juveniles’ Miranda comprehension distinguished between the
ability to understand the content of the warnings in a basic sense and the ability to
appreciate the consequences of making a waiver. 104 Another examined juveniles’
ability to recognize and recall the Miranda warnings, as well as the impact of
common Miranda misconceptions upon the waiver process.105
Juveniles’ ability to simply understand the content of Miranda warnings is
highly variable and influenced by numerous factors, from the language used in the
warning itself106 to the juvenile’s age, IQ, and academic achievement. 107 One team
of researchers collected and extensively analyzed 325 juvenile Miranda warnings,
each of which was uniquely worded, and found that “[p]aradoxically, juvenile
advisements sometimes include more difficult vocabulary words” than the general
warnings administered to adults.108 The same team tested juveniles on a list of
sixteen “Miranda-relevant terms,” and found that key words such as “consult” and
“interrogation” were “completely missed by more than 50 percent of 181 juvenile
detainees.”109 It is evident, therefore, that even understanding the vocabulary that
makes up the Miranda warnings presents a challenge.
If a juvenile does surpass that initial threshold, he must then be able to apply
those abstract concepts to the situation in which he finds himself. Though
“vocabulary comprehension is a prerequisite for both understanding and
appreciation,”110 it does not guarantee it; even when juveniles had a “general idea
about the meanings of key words,” they often “lack[ed] the specific ability to apply
such vague notions to their own waiver decisions.” 111 That gap between
comprehension and appreciation is critical.
Even if a juvenile understands the meaning of the Miranda warnings, he may
nevertheless be unable to understand the benefits conferred by those rights and the
consequences of foregoing them. One contributing factor, researchers found, was
that “[l]egally involved juveniles frequently possess serious Miranda
misconceptions.”112 For example, two-thirds of juveniles with lower levels of
“psychosocial maturity and cognitive development”113 not only “grossly
misperceive[d] law enforcement as fulfilling a helping rather than adversarial role at
104
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the time of arrest,” they also “questioned the allegiance of court-appointed
attorneys,” often believing that they were required to disclose any information that
the juvenile shared with them to the judge.114 Another study confirmed that although
juveniles “may understand the availability of an attorney, many . . . failed to grasp
the attorney’s role as a personal advocate.”115 Such misperceptions and
misunderstandings make it highly unlikely that a juvenile will choose on his own to
exercise his right to counsel.
In addition to difficulties posed by complex warnings and misperceptions about
the system, several personal traits also impact the ability of any given juvenile to
understand and appreciate the Miranda warnings. Age and IQ have long been
recognized as important, though “the relationship of each of these totality-ofcircumstances factors with understanding appears more substantial than with
appreciation.”116 Furthermore, results of a recent study indicate that academic
achievement may be a stronger indicator of the likelihood that a juvenile was able to
understand and appreciate Miranda rights than age and IQ alone.117 Finally, previous
experience with the justice system is a factor commonly considered under the totality
of the circumstances test.118 Interestingly, though various actors within the justice
system report that juveniles are more likely to invoke their rights if they have been
through the system before, 119 researchers have found “no significant relationship”
between that kind of prior experience and the ability to understand legal rights.120
Numerous factors, including age, education, and perception, all of which are
affected by the makeup of the adolescent brain, significantly impair juveniles’ ability
to understand and exercise their rights during custodial interrogation. The inability
to think abstractly and predict long-term consequences means that juveniles cannot
consistently and reliably understand their Miranda rights or the implications of
waiving them. Furthermore, without the assistance of counsel, juveniles are
presented only one set of consequences to consider by the very person who seeks to
obtain a waiver of their rights.
III. ASSESSMENT OF JUVENILE MIRANDA WAIVERS STATE BY STATE
In the wake of the Court’s decisions in In re Gault and Fare v. Michael C., a
number of states have enacted statutes that put in place measures designed to offer
greater protection of juveniles’ rights in custodial interrogation situations. 121 There
are several kinds of protections currently in effect: some states require the presence
of or opportunity to consult with an “interested adult” before a juvenile can make an
114
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effective waiver of his or her rights122 while others create a rebuttable presumption
that any admission or confession made by a juvenile under a certain age is
inadmissible.123
Many states, however, merely apply the totality of the
circumstances test when determining the validity of a juvenile’s waiver; some states
have codified the test, mandating that courts consider particular factors in their
analysis,124 while other states have developed the test through common law. 125
Among those states that employ the totality of the circumstances test, some have
pushed for mandating simpler language for juvenile Miranda warnings to aid in
ensuring comprehension.126 The following sections will examine each approach in
turn, and explain why each approach fails to adequately protect the rights of juveniles
in the justice system.
A. The Totality of the Circumstances Test
1. Variations in Application
As noted above, the Supreme Court concluded in Fare v. Michael C. that the
“totality-of-the-circumstances approach is adequate” to determine whether a juvenile
has knowingly and voluntarily waived the privilege against self-incrimination,
reasoning that lower courts have the expertise to reliably weigh such attributes as
age, experience, education, background, and intelligence. 127 In giving lower courts
the flexibility to weigh various factors and consider the circumstances unique to each
case, however, the totality approach also allows for disparate application and unjust
outcomes. The risk that juveniles’ constitutional rights may go unprotected in any
given jurisdiction far outweighs the benefits of the test.
On February 14, 1981, two police officers in Lewiston, Maine, took a fourteenyear-old boy named Nicholas into custody in connection with the burglary of his
neighbor’s apartment.128 The officers read the Miranda warnings from a card to both
Nicholas and his mother, who was present at the interrogation—the Juvenile Court
specifically found that the warnings were “explained to his mother, in the juvenile’s
presence.”129 Nicholas’s mother indicated that she understood the warnings, then
told Nicholas to “tell the truth” and the officers began to ask leading questions about
the burglary, which Nicholas answered without making an express waiver of his
122
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123
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rights.130 Following a suppression hearing, the Juvenile Court found that Nicholas
knowingly and voluntarily waived his rights. 131 On appeal, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court applied the totality of the circumstances test to assess the validity of
the waiver.132
Though neither party “question[ed] the vitality of the totality of the
circumstances approach,” the court nonetheless began its analysis by noting its
“superiority,” when “properly applied,” over per se exclusionary rules adopted in
other states.133 The court elaborated that “[l]iberal application of the rule in favor of
juvenile rights . . . is absolutely essential” and “[o]bjective satisfaction by the State
of several of the relevant factors . . . can not [sic] substitute for a critical examination
of the circumstances surrounding the confession and a sensitive understanding of a
juvenile’s vulnerability in a custodial atmosphere.” 134 In keeping with this
construction of the test, the court went on to examine closely the officers’ supposed
elaboration upon the Miranda warnings when administering them, the degree of
protection afforded by the presence of an “interested adult,” and Nicholas’s “age,
intelligence, level of education and experience with the criminal justice system.” 135
Ultimately, the court concluded that
[t]he factors noted above raise grave doubts as to whether there was a real
understanding and intelligent exercise by the juvenile of his rights. The limited
explanation of the rights to the mother of the juvenile, a young boy of limited
experience, is insufficient for us to find that Nicholas S. was aware of his rights and
the consequences of foregoing them.136

The Maine Supreme Judicial Court’s opinion in Nicholas S. reflects a thoughtful
application of the totality of the circumstances test that affords protection to
juveniles’ constitutional rights. The discretionary nature of the totality test, however,
leads to divergent applications from court to court and from state to state.
In stark contrast to Nicholas S., the Georgia Court of Appeals held in Swain v.
State that a fifteen year-old’s Miranda waiver was made voluntarily and knowingly
despite the fact that “the detective used some profanities during the interview, called
Swain a liar and coward, and told Swain some lies regarding other evidence that they
had against him.”137 The court noted with approval that “the detective did not
threaten Swain, nor did the detective promise him anything in exchange for his
confession.”138 Though the court stated that “[c]onfessions of juveniles must be
scanned with more care and received with greater caution than those of adults,” its
brief analysis does not reflect that heightened care. 139 Though age, education, and
knowledge of “the nature of his rights to consult with an attorney and remain silent”
were among the nine factors that the court considered, the analysis was so cursory as
130
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to barely accord them any weight. 140 Unlike the Maine Supreme Judicial Court, the
Georgia Court of Appeals made no apparent effort to apply the test liberally “in favor
of juvenile rights.”141 Absent explicit extortion, the court concluded that the
juvenile’s waiver and subsequent confession were made voluntarily and knowingly.
The greatest advantage of the totality test, as the Maine Supreme Judicial Court
reasoned, is that it allows courts to account for the unique circumstances present in
each case. Yet such discretionary case-by-case weighing also leaves room for
arbitrary and unequal outcomes. The Maine Supreme Judicial Court found
Nicholas’s Miranda waiver invalid, despite the fact that his mother was present and
there was no evidence that the detectives had harassed or berated him. The court
truly applied the totality test so as to protect the juvenile’s rights. In Georgia, on the
other hand, the detective was verbally abusive—calling the juvenile names and
peppering his questions with profanities—and lied to him about the evidence that the
police had against him, yet the court found that the fifteen-year-old suspect was not
coerced into waiving his constitutional rights. Swain and Nicholas represent only
two of the numerous jurisdictions that employ the totality of the circumstances
test,142 but the two cases also illustrate how wildly disparate the application of the
test can be across jurisdictions. Such unequal adjudication of children’s
constitutional claims is deeply problematic.
2. Simplified Miranda Warnings
New York and Illinois are among the states that assess juvenile Miranda waivers
using the totality of the circumstances test, but seek to provide greater protection to
juveniles through alternate means. 143 In early 2016, bills were introduced in both
state legislatures that set out new, simplified language for Miranda warnings to be
administered to juveniles.144 At the time of this writing, the New York bill remains
in committee;145 the Illinois bill passed both houses, was approved by the Governor
in August 2016, and went into effect on January 1, 2017. 146
The Illinois law and the New York bill mandate the same language; both require
that an officer read the following statement to any person under eighteen years of
140
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age, continuously and without stopping mid-warning for a response:
You have the right to remain silent. That means you do not have to say anything.
Anything you do say can be used against you in court. You have the right to get
help from a lawyer. If you cannot pay for a lawyer, the court will get you one for
free. You can ask for a lawyer at any time. You have the right to stop this interview
at any time.147

The interrogator must then ask the juvenile, “Do you want to have a lawyer?”
and “Do you want to talk to me?”148 The short sentences and “wording
comprehensible for an elementary school reading level” are designed to “ensur[e]
that youth understand their constitutional rights.”149 However, as detailed in Part
II.E.2, research shows that understanding the language of the warnings is only the
first step.
To make a truly intelligent waiver, a juvenile must not only be able to understand
the vocabulary of the warnings and the concepts that they convey, but also the nature
of the rights at stake and the consequences of giving them up. Without the assistance
of counsel, a simplified warning has very little practical effect. Though a juvenile
will likely understand better what it means that they can get a lawyer “for free” than
that counsel will be appointed for them, if the juvenile does not understand the role
of the lawyer as an advocate he cannot appreciate the consequences of foregoing that
right. The conversational tone of the simplified warnings also raises concerns with
respect to police tactics when administering the Miranda warnings.150 Though the
simplified language may be easier to understand, it also makes it easier to “blend the
warning into the conversation” and downplay its importance.151 A simplified
warning coupled with the advice of counsel would have a meaningful effect on a
juvenile’s understanding of his constitutional rights, but research suggests that
changing the language of the warning alone will have a negligible effect.
B. The “Interested Adult” Standard
In a number of states, a juvenile cannot make a valid waiver of his Miranda
rights unless a parent, guardian, or legal custodian is present (and involved, in
varying degrees depending on the jurisdiction, in the decision to do so).152 Like the
totality of the circumstances test, however, different jurisdictions have put in place
different “interested adult” requirements, some of which are more effective in
protecting of juveniles’ rights than others.
Several states merely require that a parent or guardian be present before a
147
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juvenile can make a valid waiver of his or her rights. Connecticut, Iowa, Montana,
North Carolina, and Oklahoma all have similar statutes in place. 153 All five states
draw a line at age sixteen; for juveniles who are sixteen or seventeen, Connecticut
and Iowa require that the police make “reasonable” and “good faith” efforts,
respectively, to notify the juvenile’s parent or guardian that the juvenile is in
custody.154 Montana, North Carolina, and Oklahoma permit juveniles who are
sixteen or seventeen to waive their rights as long as those waivers conform with the
requirements for adults.155 If a juvenile is under the age of sixteen, Iowa requires
that the parent give written consent for the juvenile to waive his or her rights; 156
Connecticut, on the other hand, requires that the parent or guardian be advised of the
juvenile’s rights.157 Montana, North Carolina, and Oklahoma all merely require that
the parent or guardian of a juvenile under sixteen be present before the juvenile can
waive his or her rights.158
Indiana’s juvenile Miranda waiver statute, in contrast, is far more protective of
juveniles’ rights. Under Indiana law, a “child” can only waive his Miranda rights in
the absence of a “custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad litem” if the child has
been emancipated or is married.159 If a custodial parent, guardian, or guardian ad
litem is present, that adult may waive the juvenile’s rights only if four conditions are
met: “(A) that person knowingly and voluntarily waives the right; (B) that person
has no interest adverse to the child; (C) meaningful consultation has occurred
between that person and the child; and (D) the child knowingly and voluntarily joins
with the waiver.”160 Finally, “counsel retained or appointed to represent the child”
may make a waiver “if the child knowingly and voluntarily joins with the waiver.” 161
The State “bears the burden of proving beyond a reasonable doubt that the juvenile
received all of the protections” set out in the statute and that “both the juvenile and
his or her parent knowingly, intelligently, and voluntarily waived the juvenile’s
rights.”162 The State may not introduce evidence of a statement or confession
obtained in violation of this provision.163
The statute “represents the legislature’s agreement” with the Indiana Supreme
Court’s 1972 decision in Lewis v. State, where the court concluded “that extra
protections are necessary when juveniles are faced with the prospect of waiving their
constitutional rights.”164 In that case, the Court aptly asserted that
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[i]t would indeed be inconsistent and unjust to hold that one whom the State deems
incapable of being able to marry, purchase alcoholic beverages, or even donate their
own blood, should be compelled to stand on the same footing as an adult when asked
to waive important Fifth and Sixth Amendment rights at a time most critical to him
and in an atmosphere most foreign and unfamiliar.165

This principle is of central importance and makes instinctual sense: children
whose rights and responsibilities are limited because of their age and immaturity
should not be held to the same standard as adults when it comes to surrendering
important constitutional rights. The Indiana statute reflects this principle by
requiring “meaningful consultation” between the juvenile and an adult who has the
juvenile’s interests in mind before the juvenile may make this important legal
decision.166
The mere presence of a friendly adult, without the requirement that the adult
provide substantive assistance to the juvenile, provides little protection for the child’s
rights. Indiana’s statute ensures more meaningful assistance to juveniles faced with
the Miranda waiver decision than the statutes in Connecticut, Iowa, Montana, North
Carolina, and Oklahoma, which simply require an adult’s presence. However, the
benefit of the presence and advice of an attorney is unique in this context. The
Supreme Court recognized the distinct role that lawyers play in the justice system in
Fare v. Michael C., asserting that “the lawyer occupies a critical position in our legal
system because of his unique ability to protect the Fifth Amendment rights of a client
undergoing custodial interrogation.”167 An attorney is best equipped both to dispel
the inherent pressures of the custodial setting and to advise the juvenile about the
consequences of waiving his rights and speaking to the police.
Though adults generally comprehend the Miranda warnings at a higher rate than
juveniles,168 an adult evaluating his own interests and making a waiver decision is
far different than an adult who is trying to weigh the benefits and consequences of
making a waiver on behalf of a juvenile. Adults oftentimes cannot discern and
advocate for their own interests, let alone those of a third person. Even a parent who
has a child’s best interest in mind may nevertheless hold misperceptions about the
rights at issue or feel compelled by the police-dominated environment. An attorney,
on the other hand, has training and experience in advocating for the rights of others,
and in dealing with the pressures that come with police custody.
C. Rebuttable Presumption
New Mexico takes yet another approach to juvenile Miranda waivers, creating
a presumption against the admissibility of statements made by children fourteen
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years old and younger that the State may then rebut. 169 The relevant statute first
provides that waivers made by juveniles must be knowing, intelligent, and voluntary,
and sets out eight factors that courts must consider in conducting a totality of the
circumstances analysis.170 The statute then creates a “rebuttable presumption that
any confessions, statements, or admissions made by a child thirteen or fourteen years
old to a person in a position of authority are inadmissible” against that child. 171 The
waivers of juveniles between the ages of fifteen and seventeen are evaluated using
the totality of the circumstances test.
The Supreme Court of New Mexico recently held that, in order to overcome this
presumption of inadmissibility, the State must prove by “clear and convincing
evidence” that “the child had the maturity to understand his or her constitutional and
statutory rights and the force of will to assert those rights” at the time the
interrogation took place.172 The Court went on to explain that,
[i]n order to obtain the clear and convincing evidence needed . . . the interrogator
who is in a position of authority must first adequately advise the thirteen- or
fourteen-year-old child of his or her Miranda and statutory rights and then invite the
child to explain, on the record, his or her actual comprehension and appreciation of
each Miranda warning. This could be done by having the child explain in his or her
own words—without suggestions by the interrogator—what each of the rights
means to the child.173

A few of the officers in the Minnesota juvenile cases that Barry Feld reviewed
employed this method when administering Miranda warnings to juveniles, and
“[i]nvestigators acknowledged that repeating back could better reveal whether a
youth understands the warning.”174 However, this approach ultimately falls short of
providing adequate protection for the constitutional rights of juveniles.
First, the approach outlined by the Supreme Court of New Mexico does not do
anything to shift the balance of power from the police officer who is administering
the warnings (and who wishes the juvenile to make a waiver) in favor of the child.
Even if the juvenile develops a better understanding of what those warnings mean
by repeating the warnings back to the officer in his own words, he is still unlikely to
assert his rights if the officer is suggesting that a waiver is the expected outcome, or
if he misunderstands the role of the police officer as serving a helping role. Second,
as mentioned previously, the distinction between understanding the language of the
Miranda warnings and appreciating the importance of the rights described is
significant. Consultation with an attorney not only provides the most meaningful
169
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opportunity for a juvenile to develop an appreciation for the consequences of
foregoing his rights, it increases the chances that the juvenile will be emboldened to
exercise those rights by shifting some of the power away from the officer.
D. Mandatory Consultation with Counsel
Though a handful of state courts have found individual juveniles’ Miranda
waivers invalid in cases where the juvenile was not afforded an opportunity to
consult with an attorney, at present no states mandate that juveniles consult with
counsel as a prerequisite to making a valid Miranda waiver.175 In 2015, after Joseph
Hall’s case had made its way through the California courts on direct appeal, the
California legislature passed a bill that would have adopted such a requirement. The
bill was, however, ultimately vetoed by the governor.176
The juvenile court that heard Joseph Hall’s case found that the child understood
the wrongfulness of his acts and that he had committed what would constitute second
degree murder if committed by an adult.177 The California Court of Appeal
subsequently upheld the juvenile court’s decision and Joseph’s commitment to the
Department of Corrections and Rehabilitation, Division of Juvenile Facilities
(DJF).178 Joseph’s petition for review was denied by the Supreme Court of
California.179 However, three justices felt that the petition should have been granted,
and Justice Liu wrote a powerful dissent explaining why he believed the case merited
review.180
Justice Liu argued that “whether and, if so, how the concept of a voluntary,
knowing, and intelligent Miranda waiver can be meaningfully applied to a child as
young as 10 years old,” is an important issue that affects hundreds of children in
California each year.181 He noted the paucity of cases from other states addressing
Miranda waivers by such young children and cited Supreme Court precedent and
social science research recognizing the diminished mental capabilities of children as
compared to adults. 182 Finally, in the last sentence of his dissent, Justice Liu made
a suggestion: “[o]ur legislature may wish to take up this issue in light of this court’s
decision not to do so here.”183
Four months to the day after the denial of Joseph’s petition was published, SB
175
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1052 was introduced on the floor of the California State Senate. 184 If enacted, the
bill would have required a juvenile under the age of eighteen to consult with legal
counsel before a custodial interrogation and before waiving his Miranda rights.185
The proposed law provided that, “[p]rior to a custodial interrogation, and before the
waiver of any Miranda rights, a youth under 18 years of age shall consult with legal
counsel in person.”186 Such consultation could not be waived. The legislature’s
findings, set out in section one of the bill, included conclusions from developmental
and neurological science as well as legal precedent regarding adolescent brain
development and the characteristics of youth.187 The bill quotes the Supreme Court’s
2011 decision in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, as well as Roper v. Simmons and Graham
v. Florida, among several other cases, in asserting juveniles’ vulnerability to outside
pressures, limited understanding of “the criminal justice system and the rules of the
institutional actors in it,” and characteristic lack of mature judgment.188
On September 30, 2016, Governor Jerry Brown of California vetoed SB 1052.189
In his veto message, Governor Brown stated that he was “not prepared to put into
law SB 1052’s categorical requirement that juveniles consult an attorney before
waiving their Miranda rights,” stating, “[f]rankly, we need a much fuller
understanding of the ramifications of this measure.” 190 Though the Governor noted
recent studies suggesting that “juveniles are more vulnerable than adults and easily
succumb to police pressure to talk instead of remaining silent” and showing “a much
higher percentage of false confessions” from juveniles, he also asserted that, “[o]n
the other hand, in countless cases, police investigators solve very serious crimes
through questioning.”191 In other words, the impediment to police investigations
would simply be too significant. Opponents of the bill, including Cory Salzillo, the
legislative director of the California State Sheriffs’ Association, voiced similar
concerns.192 The bill, Salzillo posited, “could have a ‘chilling’ effect on the justice
system by blocking or weakening voluntary confessions made by juveniles.” 193
Juries would not get to hear “otherwise truthful” statements made in the absence of
counsel.194 This argument, however, is one that has been made before in the Miranda
184
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context, and is one that the Supreme Court has found unconvincing.
In the half-century since Miranda was decided, the Court has interpreted and
applied the rule on numerous occasions, and has diminished its protections in some
respects.195 However, the original spirit of Miranda has not been weakened—the
Court recently observed that its decisions have “reduced the impact of the Miranda
rule on legitimate law enforcement while reaffirming the decision’s core ruling.”196
In the Miranda opinion itself, the Court remarked that “[a] recurrent argument made
in these cases is that society’s need for interrogation outweighs the privilege” against
self-incrimination.197 However, the thrust of the Court’s decision was that “the
Constitution has prescribed the rights of the individual when confronted with the
power of government when it provided in the Fifth Amendment that an individual
cannot be compelled to be a witness against himself.” 198 Whether or not warning a
suspect of his constitutional rights might have a “chilling” effect on the justice
system is, therefore, somewhat beside the point. The rights guaranteed under the
Constitution are empty promises unless the people whom they are intended to protect
can understand and assert them.
If most juveniles cannot understand their rights without the assistance of an
attorney, as studies suggest, the risk that juveniles’ constitutional rights are being
violated is far more grave than the risk of hampering the interrogation process. In
fact, high rates of Miranda waivers and confessions made during interrogations have
arguably tilted the scales too far in favor of police and prosecutors; 199 strengthening
protections for juveniles would simply help to restore the balance. Furthermore,
taking steps to ensure that confessions made by juveniles are accurate, and not the
product of fear or pressure, is in the interest of law enforcement officers just as much
as those they interrogate.
IV. ARGUMENT
“So,” Detective Hopewell said to the boy in the “Video Games vs. Homework”
t-shirt, “you have the right to remain silent. You know what that means?”200 Joseph
responded, “Yes, that means that I have the right to stay calm.”201 The two continued
their exchange, Detective Hopewell explaining each of the four warnings required
under Miranda. She told Joseph that he had the right to have a lawyer and “if you
can’t afford one,” she told him, “the court will appoint one, an attorney for you.” 202
195
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Joseph said that he understood, and agreed to talk with Detective Hopewell about
what had happened without an attorney present. 203
On appeal, Joseph argued that he “fundamentally misunderstood the nature of
Miranda and his right to be free of coercive confessions” and that he “did not
understand what was being explained” by Detective Hopewell. 204 The California
Court of Appeal, Fourth District, evaluated Joseph’s waiver under the totality of the
circumstances test, noting as relevant factors age and “the mental subnormality of
the accused.”205 The court, however, did not weigh how those specific factors likely
impacted Joseph’s ability to understand the Miranda warnings, and in fact somewhat
conflated its analysis of Joseph’s Miranda waiver with its analysis of the
voluntariness of his subsequent confession.206 Ultimately, the court concluded that
“absent coercive conduct by police, and despite his young age, his ADHD, and lowaverage intelligence, the finding that Joseph voluntarily waived his rights,
guaranteed by the Fifth Amendment, is supported by the record.”207 Ten-year-old
Joseph, who also had an individualized education program (IEP) for a learning
disability and had been subjected to neglect and abuse since his birth, nevertheless
understood his constitutional rights and knowingly gave them up.208
As noted above, the Supreme Court of California denied Joseph’s petition for
review. Joseph then filed a petition for a writ of certiorari to the Supreme Court of
the United States, urging the Court to take up the issue of whether the totality of the
circumstances analysis for Miranda waivers is sufficient to protect juveniles’
rights.209 Noting the Court’s recognition of the stark difference between the
cognitive abilities of adults and children, the petition urged the Court to provide
guidance regarding “the legal significance of these issues to the evaluation of
whether a child has given a valid waiver of important constitutional rights in
custodial interrogations.”210 The “bottom-up” approach has failed, Joseph argued,
as decisions in lower courts remain “ad hoc” and fail to give proper weight to the
relevant scientific findings.211 The Supreme Court denied Joseph’s petition for
certiorari on October 3, 2016.212
As Joseph’s petition correctly observed, police, judges, and legislators across
the country have grappled with how to appropriately resolve the challenges that arise
when children come into contact with the criminal justice system. Studies
documenting the crucial differences between the capabilities of juveniles and adults
continue to grow in number and, as the Supreme Court has recognized in the context
of the Eighth Amendment, elucidate the critical need to provide greater protection to
juveniles.213 As the law stands now, the disparate approaches to evaluating juvenile
Miranda waivers across jurisdictions mean that a Miranda waiver made by a sixteen203
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year-old in Florida will be evaluated differently than that of his peers in California
or New Mexico or Maine. Given this disparity, the Supreme Court should take up
the issue and establish meaningful prophylactic protections for juveniles by
mandating consultation with counsel before a valid waiver can be made.
The insights from social and cognitive science that have become critical
foundation for the Supreme Court’s modern Eighth Amendment jurisprudence are
likewise compelling in the Fifth Amendment realm. The Supreme Court recognized
the importance of age in the context of police interrogation in J.D.B. v. North
Carolina, holding that a child’s age must be accounted for in the Miranda custody
analysis if it was known to the officer at the time of police questioning or would have
been objectively apparent to a reasonable officer.214 The Court relied on Graham
and Roper, among other precedent, in concluding that age “generates commonsense
conclusions about behavior and perception,” including that juveniles are more
susceptible to police pressure than adults. 215 Consequently, the Court extended the
prophylactic Miranda protections for children and thus acknowledged that the
warnings may have to be administered to juveniles in situations where an adult would
not be considered “in custody” for Miranda purposes.
From Haley to Gault to J.D.B, and in many decisions in between, the Court has
drawn a line between juveniles and adults. The J.D.B. Court cited “the legal
disqualifications placed on children as a class” more broadly, including “limitations
on their ability to alienate property, enter a binding contract enforceable against
them, and marry without parental consent,” as evidence of “the settled understanding
that the differentiating characteristics of youth are universal.” 216 Yet despite this
authoritative assertion, the impact of those “differentiating characteristics” is not
universally recognized in the legal system, including in the Fifth Amendment
context. A child who cannot enter a binding contract or marry without parental
consent can nonetheless waive important constitutional rights in a situation where
his individual liberty is at stake.
Recent studies indicate that the Miranda warnings alone do not offer meaningful
protection to juveniles subjected to custodial interrogation. Even if a juvenile can
understand the language of the warning, which is often not the case, he must then be
able to imagine two alternative outcomes and weigh the consequences of each course
of action. Most juveniles do not have the cognitive capacity to do so; they lack the
“neural hardware” required to engage in that kind of reasoning. 217 A juvenile’s
ability to foresee the consequences of waiving his Miranda rights is further hampered
if he possesses one or more of many common misperceptions about the system. For
example, if a child believes that a court-appointed attorney is required to disclose to
the judge any information that he shares, he will be unlikely to invoke his right to
counsel; if a child is among the two-thirds of juveniles who perceive law enforcement
as fulfilling a helping rather than an adversarial role, he may believe that if he just
tells the officer his side of the story the officer will help him and he will be able to
go home.218 In order to fully comprehend and appreciate the rights set out in the
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Miranda warnings, a person must engage in fairly complex legal reasoning. A
juvenile is far too apt to miss the mark when proceeding without assistance.
In the “adversarial balance between the individual and the state,”219 the
individual is often at a disadvantage. This is true for adults as well as children, and
the problem of Miranda comprehension is certainly not limited to children alone. 220
However, the vast majority of juveniles—four-fifths, according to one study—
cannot comprehend the entirety of the Miranda warnings.221 The odds are that a
juvenile will not understand the Miranda warnings when they are administered to
him, and the potential harm to his constitutional rights in such a situation is great.
As such, courts should, and do, draw the line differently for children. Simply
allowing lower courts to assign weight and significance to age in the waiver analysis,
however, is not sufficient. Because the odds of incomprehension among juveniles
are so high, a categorical rule is warranted. The only way to ensure that juveniles’
constitutional rights are protected is to require that every juvenile consult with
counsel before making a Miranda waiver.
The procedures that are currently in place to assess juveniles’ Miranda waivers
vary wildly between jurisdictions, and lead to unequal and unjust outcomes for
similarly situated juveniles across the United States. Most jurisdictions assess
juveniles’ waivers by weighing the totality of the circumstances, including age,
education, and experience, among others. Though the flexibility that this test affords
has been hailed as an advantage, it has led to ad hoc decisions that often fail to give
weight to the unique characteristics of youth that make juveniles particularly
vulnerable to police tactics. Despite the Supreme Court’s assertion that
understanding of these “universal” differences between adults and children is
“settled,” many lower court decisions suggest otherwise.222
Some states have put in place additional protections for juveniles, the most
common being the requirement that a juvenile meaningfully consult with an
“interested adult” before making a Miranda waiver. Though the presence of a
friendly adult may help to dispel the pressures of the interrogation, even an adult
who has the child’s best interests in mind may be unable to understand and explain
the importance of the rights set out in the Miranda warnings. Attorneys are, as the
Supreme Court recognized, uniquely equipped “to protect the Fifth Amendment
rights of a client undergoing custodial interrogation.”223 An attorney understands the
power of the right to remain silent, and the serious implications of making statements
that can later be introduced in a court proceeding. In addition to protecting his
client’s rights, the attorney can ensure that the Miranda warnings are not downplayed
and treated as mere protocol and, if the juvenile does decide to speak to the police,
help to guard against the use of coercive tactics in the course of interrogation.
Consultation with an attorney provides a meaningful opportunity for a juvenile to
understand and exercise his constitutional rights.
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V. CONCLUSION
More than a million children are arrested each year in the United States, and
those children face important decisions that they should not have to make alone. The
Supreme Court has highlighted, both in its Eighth Amendment precedent and in the
context of the Fifth Amendment in J.D.B. v. North Carolina, the innate
characteristics of youth that have serious implications for juveniles caught up in the
justice system. Studies assessing Miranda comprehension show that these
characteristics prevent juveniles from understanding Miranda warnings and
appreciating their importance. To protect juveniles’ Fifth Amendment rights and to
ensure that the constitutional rule set out in Miranda is applied equally, the Supreme
Court should create a per se rule making any waiver by a juvenile invalid unless he
first consulted with counsel.

